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Abstract
To teach agents through natural language in-
teraction, we need methods for updating the
agent’s knowledge, given a teacher’s feedback.
But natural language is ambiguous at many
levels and so a major challenge is for the agent
to disambiguate the intended message, given
the signal and the context in which it’s ut-
tered. In this paper we look at how coherence
relations can be used to help disambiguate
the teachers’ feedback and so contribute to
the agent’s reasoning about how to solve their
domain-level task. We conduct experiments
where the agent must learn to build towers that
comply with a set of rules, which the agent
starts out ignorant of. It is also unaware of
the concepts used to express the rules. We ex-
tend a model for learning these tasks which is
based on coherence and show experimentally
that our extensions can improve how fast the
agent learns.
1 Introduction
Many commercial scenarios create planning prob-
lems consisting of goal conditions which are
complex and vaguely specified. An example is
problems created by Standard Operating Proce-
dures (SOPs)—large manuals containing instruc-
tions and rules which workers must follow. In
companies such as Amazon or Ocado these fea-
ture rules such as “make sure the box is properly
sealed” or “never put frozen items in the same bag
as meat products”.
Building a precise formal representation of such
problems which supports inference and planning
is a challenging task for two reasons. Firstly, the
array of contingencies where SOPs apply may be
so extensive that it is untenable for a domain ex-
pert to communicate all these possibilities to a
software developer; and secondly, the SOPs of-
ten change in unforeseen ways (such as in bespoke
manufacturing or large online retail where product
lines are highly dynamic), making previously ir-
relevant concepts become relevant. For example,
a company that starts to sell batteries must ensure
the labels are put to the left rather than right of the
package (this is a SOP in Amazon (Personal Com-
munication)). This spatial relation may not have
been part of the original domain specification, but
an agent that had to follow this rule would now
have to refine their domain model to include it, and
learn what the word “left” means.
Since communicating the current SOPs is dif-
ficult and they change periodically, it would be
useful for the domain expert to be able to teach
the agent personally, after the agent has been de-
ployed. A natural way to do so is through a
teacher-apprentice interaction where the teacher
observes the apprentice attempting to complete the
task, reacting when the apprentice performs ac-
tions inconsistent with the SOPs. This way of
teaching is simpler on the teacher since it is easier
to react to a situation than predicting all contingen-
cies in advance. The apprentice, in this situation,
must have the capacity to learn the constraints as
well as new concepts which were not previously a
part of their domain model.
In this paper we tackle a task which is analo-
gous to, but simpler than, SOP compliant pack-
ing. Instead of rules referring to weight or fragility
(“don’t put heavy things above eggs” or “protect
the vase with bubble wrap because it is fragile”),
in our task the agent must learn and reason about
constraints in a blocks world where colour is a
proxy for these concepts (e.g. “put red blocks on
blue blocks”). The agent starts out with a domain
model with no colour concepts, nor does it have
any colour terms within its natural language vo-
cabulary. It must learn from a teacher both the
rules that constrain the task, and how to ground
the previously unknown colour terms (which pop-
ulate the rules).
This work extends the task and agent in Appel-
gren and Lascarides (2019) where an agent learns
from a simulated teacher’s corrective feedback.
They build a graphical model that captures the se-
mantics of correction. This allows the agent to
learn to recognise colours and learn which con-
straints are a part of the goal. We address two
shortcomings of their paper by: 1) utilising the
evidence that the teacher has not corrected the
agent’s latest action, and 2) extending the model
to capture extended dialogue, allowing us to deal
with anaphoric expressions, which are ubiquitous
in spontaneous natural language interactions.
2 Related Work
Teaching agents through interaction is a cen-
tral theme in areas such as Learning through
Demonstration (Argall et al., 2009), advice giving
(Maclin and Shavlik, 1996; Kuhlmann et al., 2004;
Benavent and Zanuttini, 2018), and learning re-
ward functions in Reinforcement Learning (Chris-
tiano et al., 2017; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016).
However, the area that shares our goals most is In-
teractive Task Learning (ITL) (Laird et al., 2017).
ITL focuses on teaching agents the parameters
or rules which govern a task, rather than opti-
mising a known task (such as in Reinforcement
Learning), through interaction with a teacher (e.g.
(Scheutz et al., 2017; Lindes et al., 2017; She
et al., 2014; Chai, 2018))). The main contribu-
tion of our work and of Appelgren and Lascarides
(2019) is to extend the types of interaction which
teachers perform beyond instructions and defini-
tions, with a focus in this paper on correction and
elaboration. Correction has only been studied with
use of very simple language; e.g. “no” (Nicolescu
and Mataric, 2003).
The goal in our task is to learn to identify valid
sequential plans autonomously, as opposed to
learning how to perform new actions by combin-
ing primitive actions (Chai, 2018; Scheutz et al.,
2017) or learning low level motor control di-
rectly (Knox and Stone, 2009). The agent must
also refine its domain model with unforeseen con-
cepts that are discoverd through interaction, as op-
posed to having a full domain conceptualisation
and needing only to learn to map language onto
these known concepts (contra Wang et al. (2016);
Kuhlmann et al. (2004)). To do this language
grounding we follow an approach where individ-
Figure 1: The shades used for blocks within each
colour category.
ual classifiers are trained for each concept (Ma-
tuszek, 2018).
3 Task
Agents must learn a tower building task in the
blocks world. Each scenario consists of 10
coloured blocks that must be placed into a tower.
The resulting tower must conform to a set of con-
straints, or rules, which are part of the task’s goal
description, G. In this paper we consider rules of
two forms:
rc1,c21 = ∀x.c1(x)→ ∃y.c2(y) ∧ on(x, y) (1)
rc1,c22 = ∀y.c2(y)→ ∃x.c1(x) ∧ on(x, y) (2)
where c1 and c2 are colours (e.g., red, blue, ma-
roon).
The task is implemented in a virtual envi-
ronment, where each scenario is defined in the
Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL).
Agents interact with the world through the action
put(x, y), which simply places object x on ob-
ject y. In each scenario, the agent must build a
tower consistent with G. However, it begins ig-
norant of the specific constraints that define G.
Further, the agent can see what blocks exist and
their spatial relation to each other, but it is un-
aware of what colour terms are used to describe
them. Instead, it only observes the RGB values of
each block (henceforth referred to as F (x)). Ad-
ditionally, the agent begins with no knowledge of
what colour terms exist or what parts of the RGB
spectrum divide into different colour terms (ie, it
is unaware of the terms in Figure 1 and what dis-
parate RGB values map to a particular concept).
As such, the agent faces the problem of jointly
learning: (a) the vocabulary of colour terms; (b)
how to ground those terms in the embodied envi-
ronment (i.e. finding a mapping from colour term
to the range of RGB values it denotes); and (c)
the constraints on the goal G, in terms of those
colours.
A teacher observes the agent attempting to build
the towers. Every time the agent takes an action
which breaks one of the rules in G (or which leads
to a situation where a rule will inevitably be bro-
ken) the teacher provides verbal feedback. The
feedback serves to correct the agents mistake by
providing an explanation as to why the action was
incorrect. However, the verbal component may be
ambiguous between several rules (see Section 4
for details). Thus, the agent must disambiguate the
teacher’s intended message while simultaneously
learning to ground new terms in the embodied en-
vironment by learning the partition of RGB values
into the concepts in Figure 1.
4 Coherence
The agent must learn the task by exploiting evi-
dence supplied by the teacher’s dialogue actions.
It does this by reasoning about how the teacher’s
utterance coherently connects to the context in
which it was uttered. To simplify matters we as-
sume that all the teacher’s dialogue moves are co-
herent, sincere (i.e. she believes what she says)
and competent (i.e. what she believes is true).
The basic dialogue move the teacher makes is a
correction of the form u = “no, put red blocks on
blue blocks” (or any other pair of colours). This
utterance is ambiguous between rules rred,blue1
and rred,blue2 (henceforth shortened to r
r,b
1 and
rr,b2 ). The semantics of correction stipulate that
the content of the correction must negate some
part of the corrected action (Asher and Lascarides,
2003). In our planning domain, this means that
the teacher will utter u if the agent’s latest action
a = put(x, y) violates the rule that she intended
u to express, as stipulated in (3), where V (r, a)
represents that rule r was violated by action a:
Corr(a, u)↔
(rr,b1 ∈ G∧V (rr,b1 , a))∨ (rr,b2 ∈ G∧V (rr,b2 , a))
(3)
The action a can violate a rule in the goal in
two ways. For the first case, consider S1 in Fig-
ure 2. If rr,b1 ∈ G, then an action resulting in S1
would directly violate the rule since rr,b1 requires
each red block to be on a blue block, but here a
red block was put on a non-blue block. Where
a = put(o1, o2), this Direct violation is expressed
as (4), and similarly S2 directly violates r
r,b
2 be-
cause of (5):
VD(r
r,b
1 , a)↔
red(o1) ∧ ¬blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2) (4)
VD(r
r,b
2 , a)↔
¬red(o1) ∧ blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2) (5)
rr,b1 is not directly violated in S2 and r
r,b
2 is not
directly violated in S1. However, these rules are
respectively Indirectly violated: it is impossible
to complete a rule-compliant tower without first
removing the top block from it. That is, an in-
direct violation of rr,b1 means that there are more
red blocks on the table than blue ones, and fur-
thermore (given that it violates the latest action
put(o, o)), this was not the case before this ac-
tion, and therefore o2 must be blue and o2 not red.
Formally, indirect violations of the rule rr,b1 (which
is satisfied by S2) and r
r,b
2 (which is satisfied by
S1) are respectively defined by (6) and (7):
VI(r
r,b
1 , a)↔ ¬red(o1)∧blue(o2)∧on(o1, o2)∧
|{o3 : red(o3) ∧ on(o3, table)}| >
|{o4 : blue(o4) ∧ on(o4, table)}| (6)
VI(r
r,b
2 , a)↔ red(o1)∧¬blue(o2)∧on(o1, o2)∧
|{o3 : blue(o3) ∧ on(o3, table)}| >
|{o4 : blue(o4) ∧ on(o4, table)}| (7)
When uttering u, our teacher helps the agent to
determine which type of violation has happened
by pointing at the tower if it’s a Direct violation
VD or pointing at the block which can no longer
be placed in the tower if it’s an Indirect violation
VI .
If the agent can ground either the colour term
“red” and/or “blue” to blocks of those colours,
then it can use the coherence equations (4)–(7)
to infer whether the teacher’s utterance u was in-
tended to convey rr,b1 , or r
r,b
2 . Conversely, if an
agent knows the intended meaning of u, then it
can use these equations to make inferences about
the colours of the blocks. However, our agent may
know neither how to ground the colour terms (i.e.,
it can observe the RGB values but doesn’t know
what colour terms denote them) nor know how to
Figure 2: These two states would both be corrected if
either r(r,b)1 or r
(r,b)
2 were in the goal.
disambiguate u. Therefore, in a context where the
agent is sufficiently unsure as to the correct inter-
pretation of the correction, because it is also un-
sure about how to ground the colour terms in u in
the current visual scene, we allow the agent to ut-
ter a query, all of whose possible answers resolve
the ambiguity. Due to the constraints expressed
in (4)–(7), finding out the colour of just one of
the blocks is sufficient to infer both the intended
meaning of u and whether the situation is like S1
or S2 above. So the agent will simply ask such
a yes/no question: for example, “is the top block
red?”. The teacher’s answer provides the agent
with an anchoring point, from which it can make
further inferences via (4)–(7).
Additionally, when the teacher doesn’t correct
the agent’s latest action a, then via the above
equations, together with the agent’s current beliefs
about which blocks are which colours, the agent
can infer beliefs about which rules are not a part of
the goal (on the grounds that if that rule had been
in the goal, a correction of a would have been ut-
tered).
Interpreting u only requires knowledge of the
action a it corrects. However, certain utterances
are only interpretable through their coherent con-
nection to previous dialogue. In this paper, our
teacher uses two such utterances: u2 = “no, that
is wrong for the same reason” and u3 = “no, that
is not red either”. u2 presupposes a prior (identi-
cal) reason (in our task, a rule violation) is a part
of the multimodal context; u3 presupposes that
something else (in the context) is not red.
In line with existing coherence-based theories
of discourse (eg., Hobbs (1985); Kehler (2002);
Asher and Lascarides (2003)) we assume that any
utterance containing an anaphor or presupposition
must be coherently connected to the unit that con-
tains its antecedent. Thus u2 (or u3) must coher-
ently attach to more than just the agent’s latest ac-
tion a; it must also attach to a prior utterance—this
is why starting a dialogue with u2 or u3 sounds
anomalous. Constraints on which parts of an em-
bodied dialogue context the current utterance can
coherently connect to are not yet fully understood
(though see (Hunter et al., 2018) for initial work).
We therefore take a very permissive approach: in
principle, u2 (or u3) can coherently attach to any
prior dialogue move. However, in line with exist-
ing theories of discourse interpretation, we adopt
a preference for attaching to the most recent utter-
ance u that supports a coherent interpretation, and
in particular resolves the anaphor. In other words,
an utterance of the form u2 or u3 attaches with cor-
rection to the latest agent’s action a, but also to the
most recent prior utterance u where a coherence
relation R(u, u2) (or R(u, u3)) can be established
and an antecedent identified.
The utterance u2 can be interpreted as an elab-
oration of any prior correction u: even if u were
simply the expression “no”, thanks to (3) a vio-
lation can be accommodated as part of the content
of u precisely because it corrects an agent’s (prior)
action. Thus in embodied dialogue (1), u2 attaches
to a2 with correction and also to u1 with elabora-
tion (because u1 is more recent than u0):
(1) a. a0: put(o1, o2)
b. u0: “No, put green blocks on orange
blocks”
c. a1: put(o3, o4)
d. u1: “No, put red blocks on blue
blocks”
e. a2: put(o5, o6)
f. u2: “No, that is wrong for the same
reason”
The relation elaboration(u, u) entails that how-
ever u1 is disambiguated—ie, r
r,b
1 , or r
r,b
2 —“the
reason” in u2 refers to the same rule. So a1 and
a2 both violate the same rule, and so impose joint
constraints on the colours of the four blocks o3, o4,
o5 and o6. This differs from the interpretation of a
similar dialogue where the agent says u′2 below:
(2) a. a1: put(o3, o4)
b. u1: “No, put red blocks on blue
blocks”
c. a2: put(o5, o6)
d. u′2: “No, put red blocks on blue
blocks”
u′2 doesn’t feature any anaphoric expression, and
so coherence does not demand that it be related to
u1. Thus the ambiguities in u1 and u2 may resolve
in different ways. This illustrates how anaphora
can impose additional constraints on interpretation
of both the linguistic and non-linguistic moves.
Our model (Section 5) and experiments (Sec-
tion 6) show that exploiting anaphora in the inter-
action helps the agent to learn faster.
The utterance u3 = “that is not red either”
requires an antecedent individual that’s not red.
With this in mind, consider dialogue (3):
(3) a. a0: put(o1, o2)
b. u0: “No, put orange blocks on red
blocks”
c. a1: put(o3, o4)
d. u1: “No, put red blocks on blue
blocks”
e. a2: put(o5, o6)
f. u2: “No, put purple blocks on pink
blocks”
g. a3: put(o7, o8)
h. u3: “No, that is not red either”
The utterance u3 corrects a3, and coherence de-
mands that it also attach to a prior utterance that
entails that something isn’t red. It cannot attach
to u2 with elaboration or with any other relation:
in particular, it cannot elaborate either of the rules
that u2 might express while at the same time vio-
lating a rule that’s expressed in terms of red, which
it must do given that u3 corrects an action (i.e., a3).
On the other hand, if the agent’s beliefs about the
colours of o3 and o4 are consistent with resolving
the ambiguity in u1 to r
r,b
2 , then by (5) this inter-
pretation provides an antecedent that’s not red—
namely o3—and moreover it supports an elabora-
tion relation between u1 and u3. Thus discourse
coherence results in u3 attaching to u1 with elab-
oration, u1 gets resolved to mean r
r,b
2 , and hence
(via equation (5)) o3 and o7 are not red and o4 and
o8 are blue.
5 Method
We build an agent which utilises coherence to
learn from the teacher’s feedback. The agent ar-
chitecture is the same as in Appelgren and Las-
carides (2019) except the model for learning from
correction is replaced. Figure 3 shows an overview
of the system. The main components are the action
Figure 3: The agent consists of an action selection sys-
tem (yellow) and a learning system (green). Action se-
lection uses a symbolic planner to find a plan given the
most likely goal and grounding of colour terms. The
learning system uses coherence to build a probability
model, used to learn what rules are in the goal and how
to ground colour terms.
selection system, which makes use of a symbolic
planner (Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001), a search
strategy to find the most likely plan consistent with
what has been learned so far, and the correction
handling system, which learns from the dialogue.
The agent learns to find the most likely rules
that are part of the goal G and learns classifiers
for colour terms. The classifiers (which we call
the grounding models) are binary classifiers for
every relevant colour, such as P (Red(x)|F (x))
and P (Blue(x)|F (x)). These are estimated us-
ing Bayes Rule, utilising Weighted Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) (Gisbert, 2003) for estimating
P (F (x)|Red(x)).
5.1 Learning from Dialogue moves
The agent must learn what the rules are and how to
ground colour terms. To learn the rules the agent
must resolve the ambiguity in the teacher’s mes-
sages. To learn the colours the agent must asso-
ciate the RGB values to colour words, thus creat-
ing training data. Both outcomes are linked, since
disambiguation of messages leads to learning the
rules and associates colour words to blocks, but
resolving the ambiguity requires knowledge of
colours.
To resolve the ambiguity and use the available
evidence to learn, we build a probability model
which captures the semantics of the dialogue, and
how it links to the environment, by capturing equa-
tions (3)–(7) in a probabilistic graphical model.
The model is updated dynamically each time a
new dialogue move is performed, adding new fac-
tors and new evidence, rather than creating a new
model for every correction as is done by Appel-
gren and Lascarides (2019).
Specifically, when a correction is uttered a set
of nodes are added to the current model of the di-
alogue. As an example we shall use u = “no,
put red blocks on blue blocks” being directly vi-
olated. The nodes added from this correction can
be seen in Figure 4. Here we know that equation
(3) must hold, with rules rr,b1 or r
r,b
2 . This is cap-
tured by adding a node Corr(a, u), which is bi-
nary and observed to be True. Connected to this
node are nodes VD(r
r,b
1 , a), VD(r
r,b
2 , a), r
r,b
1 ∈ G,
and rr,b2 ∈ G. These are also binary variables, but
they are latent. In the probability model this cre-
ates a factor
P (Corri(a, u)|VD(rr,b1 , a), VD(rr,b2 , a),
rr,b1 ∈ G, rr,b2 ∈ G) (8)
Which gives probability 1 to any outcome which
satisfies equation (3).
For each VD(r
r,b
i ), additional nodes are created
to capture equations (4) and (5). The nodes cap-
ture the colour of the relevant objects: Red(o1)
and Blue(o2). The probability distribution (9) is
1 whenever the values of the variables satisfy those
in equations (4) and (5).
P (VD(r
r,b
1 , a)|Red(o1), Blue(o2)) (9)
Since Red(o1) and Blue(o2) aren’t observ-
able, nodes are also added for the observable
RGB values of the objects: F (o1) and F (o2).
P (Red(o1)|F (o1)) and P (Blue(o2)|F (o2)),
which are the aforementioned grounding models,
are learned using a weighted KDE. We also add
priors for P (rr,bi ∈ G) which are set to 0.01 and
for P (Red(o1)) and P (Blue(o2)) which is set to
0.5.
The difference from Appelgren and Lascarides
(2019) comes from the fact that when further cor-
rections are given the model is updated by adding
new nodes for the new correction and the possible
violations it denotes. These nodes will be linked
together if, for example, the same rule or the same
blocks appear in the several corrections. This al-
lows the agent to make inferences which change a
belief from a previous correction given the new ev-
idence. However, the biggest strength comes from
modelling the interpretation of the anaphoric ut-
terances, as discussed in Section 4.
5.1.1 Updating when no correction occurs
When a correction is given the agent adds nodes
for the rules which are entailed by the content
of the correction and observes Corr(u, a) =
True. When no correction is given the agent in-
stead adds nodes for all known rules and observes
Corr(u, a) = False. That is, the agent adds a
correction node which captures the fact that no
rule which is in the goal was violated (through the
negative case of equation (3)) as well as the nodes
for direct violation of rules, capturing equations
(4) and (5). Thus, the only non-zero probability
interpretations of a non-corrected action are those
which ensure these equations hold.
5.1.2 Handling Anaphoric Utterances
A discussed in Section 4, when an elaboration,
such as Elaboration(u1, u2) from dialogue (1),
is given, the agent knows that the content of u1
applies to the current action (a2) and that the same
rule must be violated by both a1 and a2. Thus, the
nodes which were added for u1 and a1 are also
added for the action a2, as seen in Section 5.1.
Further, an additional factor is added to capture
that the same rule must be violated. This factor
depends on V (ri, ai) for the relevant rules and ac-
tions:
φ(V (rr,b1 , a1), V (r
r,b
2 , a1), V (r
r,b
1 , a2), V (r
r,b
2 , a2))
(10)
The factor gives a score of 0 to any situation where
one of the rules, rr,bi , is violated for one of a1 or a2
but not the other, thus enforcing the constraint that
the same rule must be violated in both situations.
When it comes to “no, that is not red either”
(see dialogue (3)) the same applies. Further, we
know that o3 and o7 are ¬red. The effect of this
in our model is to add ¬red(o3) and ¬red(o7) as
observed variables, whereas they would be latent
Red(o1)
F (o1)
Blue(o2)
F (o2)
rr,b1 ∈ G V (r
r,b
1 , a) r
r,b
2 ∈ GV (r
r,b
2 , a)
Corr(u, a)
Figure 4: The nodes added to the probabilistic graphi-
cal model after a correction u = “no, put red blocks on
blue blocks”. Grey nodes are observed and white ones
are latent.
otherwise. Similarly, after a question is answered,
the agent adds the ‘colour’ node’s value to the ob-
served variables.
As we see, the structure of our model makes it
straight forward to add new logical constraints, as
imposed by symbolic semantic models of coherent
discourse, by adding factors that force probabili-
ties to zero when an interpretation is deemed by
the symbolic semantic model to be incoherent.
5.2 Updating the Goal
The graphical model is used by the agent to esti-
mate which rules are most likely to be in the goal.
This is done by finding the rules which have the
highest probability of being in the goal:
argmax P (ri ∈ G|X) (11)
whereX represents the available observations (in-
cluding the RGB values, correction variables, and
observed colour variables). Since ri being in G is
a binary decision, this means all rules which have
a probability higher than 0.5 of being in the goal
are added and the rest are not.
5.3 Updating the Grounding Models
To update the grounding models we seek labels for
individual colours. Since our graphical model cre-
ates constraints on what colours blocks may have,
we use the probability estimate as a soft label to
update our model. For example let
w = P (Red(o1) = True|X) (12)
Figure 5: Cumulative regret averaged over 50 different
trials on a planning problem containing three rules.
then w is used as a weighted label for o1 which
is used to update the probability density using
weighted KDE.
6 Experiments
Our experiments test two hypotheses: exploiting
anaphora when repeating a prior correction will
lead to the agent learning to make fewer planning
errors; and exploiting the evidence given by un-
corrected moves will also lead to faster learning.
To test this we run four different set ups. First,
we vary the teacher’s dialogue strategy between
anaphor, in which she uses utterances like u2 and
u3 in dialogues (1) and (4) when the agent repeats
an error, and no-anaphor, in which even for the
agent’s repeated errors, she repeats an utterance of
the form u = “no, put red blocks on blue blocks”.
Second, we vary the agent’s reasoning about the
task, between simple, in which it updates its prob-
abilistic model only when the teacher says some-
thing, vs. full, in which it updates its model ev-
ery time it performs an action put(x, y), taking
the teacher’s silence to be a meaningful act as de-
scribed in Section 5.1.1. The two types of teachers
and agents gives four different combinations.
Each of these four combinations is run on 50
different planning problems—that is, we experi-
ment with 50 different goals G, where each G is
defined by two or three rules drawn from pairs of
different colour categories and shades, such as red,
purple, or maroon. Each planning problem (or G)
is learned via a sequence of 50 scenarios: in each
scenario the agent is presented with a (distinct) ini-
tial state of 10 blocks on the table, and the agent
has to complete a tower that satisfies G, aided
by the teacher’s feedback. The colour of the 10
Figure 6: Cumulative regret averaged over 50 different
trials on a planning problem containing two rules.
blocks in each scenario is randomly generated by
either selecting a completely random colour with
probability 0.2 or (with probability 0.8) selecting
a pair of colours present in one of the rules (e.g.
red and blue for rr,b1 ), selecting randomly from the
hues of those colours, which biases states to in-
clude many of the constrained colours. We filter
out any scenarios for which no correct tower ex-
ists. To measure the effectiveness of the agent we
measure regret, accumulated over the 50 scenar-
ios. Regret is simply the number of mistakes the
agent makes, i.e. the number of corrected actions
it performs.
6.1 Results
We present results for for experiments where each
goal consists of two rules (Figure 6) and three
rules (Figure 5).
Our hypothesis was that anaphors would help
the agent make fewer mistakes; similarly for us-
ing the full evidence. Both of these results can be
observed in the Figures 6 and 5. To test the sig-
nificance of these results we performed a paired
t-test on the total regret of each agent. The tests
are made pairwise between agents using simple
vs full, but keeping anaphor fixed, and between
anaphor and no-anaphor, keeping simple vs full
fixed. These significance tests are in Table 1.
These tests confirm that learning from the
teacher’s silence, as well as from corrective
moves, speeds up learning significantly. These
benefits stem mainly from the ability to observe
more training examples of colours, colour learning
being the major bottleneck in this problem. The
effects of anaphora on learning is more nuanced,
however. The fact that exploiting anaphora sig-
Two Rules Three Rules
s/s+a t=1.5, p=0.14 t=2.6, p=0.012
s/f t=4.39, p=6.1e-5 t=4.4, p=6.1e-5
s+a/f+a t=2.1, p=0.046 2.1, p=0.043
f/f+a t=2.3, p=0.024 t=3.9, p=3.1e-4
Table 1: Results of t-test between combinations of sim-
ple (s) with and without anaphora (a) and full (f) with
and without anaphora (the superior system in bold).
nificantly improves performance for the three-rule
case, but in the two-rule case it is not quite signif-
icant, suggests that the more complex the (latent)
goal, the more useful anaphora will be. A further
issue concerning the utility of anaphora could also
be linked to the way we constructed the 50 ini-
tial states for each planning problem (see earlier
discussion), which does not guarantee that if rr,b1 ,
say, is a rule in G, then the initial state contains at
least two red blocks of a different hue and/or two
blue blocks of a different hue.
7 Conclusion
We presented a novel graphical model which
exploits the semantics of coherent discourse to
jointly learn three tasks via natural language inter-
action with a teacher: how to refine the domain
model to include new concepts; how to ground
novel natural language terms to those concepts;
and how to infer the correct goal description, so
as to construct valid sequential plans. The graphi-
cal model extends on previous work by allowing it
to learn from uncorrected moves in the dialogue
as well as from utterances containing anaphoric
expressions. Our experiments show that these ex-
tensions can help reduce the number of mistakes
made by the agent while learning the task. In the
future we intend to tackle more complex planning
problems, featuring goal constraints with more
complex structure, that are expressed in terms of
unforeseen concepts other than colour. Addition-
ally we intend to drop assumptions about the in-
fallibility of the teacher.
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